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ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION 
FOR SUI GENERIS DATABASES 
CHANA RUNGROJTANAKUL· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The economic justification for sui generis databases needs to be reexam-
ined. Unrestricted import and export of goods and services between na-
tions is part of an ideal international trade policy that is subject to the 
fundamental economic theories of "Demand-Supply" and "Maximiza-
tion" (comparative advantage). Against the prevailing wisdom that free-
flowing commerce would threaten domestic producers, 18th century po-
litical economist and philosopher Adam Smith believed that, based upon 
comparative advantage theory, nations should export what they can pro-
duce most efficiently and inexpensively and import "what it will cost 
them more to make than to buy."l In opposition to the concept of free 
* LL.B. Chu1a10ngkorn University, 1992; LL.M. (Taxation), 1994; LL.M. (International 
Legal Studies), 1995: SJ.D. (International Legal Studies), Golden Gate University, 2005. 
I. 4 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS § 2, at 12 (1776) ("If a foreign country can 
supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some 
part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage."). 
See also, Steven Suranovic, The Theory of Comparative Advantage - Overview (last visited Sept. 20, 
2005) <http://internationalecon.comlv 1.0/ch40/40cOOO.htm1>. 
The theory of comparative advantage is perhaps the most important concept in interna-
tional trade theory. It is also one of the most commonly misunderstood principles. There 
is a popular story told amongst economists that once when an economics skeptic asked 
Paul Samuelson (a Nobel laureate in economics) to provide a meaningful and non-trivial 
result from the economics discipline, Samuelson quickly responded with, "comparative 
advantage." The sources of the misunderstandings are easy to identifY. First, the princi-
ple of comparative advantage is clearly counter-intuitive. Many results from the formal 
model are contrary to simple logic. Secondly, the theory is easy to confuse with another 
notion about advantageous trade, known in trade theory as the theory of absolute advan-
tage. The logic behind absolute advantage is quite intuitive. This confusion between 
these two concepts leads many people to think that they understand comparative advan-
tage when in fact, what they understand, is absolute advantage. Finally, the theory of 
141 
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trade, protectionism continues to be promoted in the interest of defending 
domestic industries from foreign competition. 
The European invention of the sui generis system promotes unfair com-
petition. Under the European Database Directive's regime, the economic 
interest of the European database makers has been satisfied as the protec-
tion of factual and data content is granted to them. 2 Not only the dura-
tion of protection that creates an unlimited term of protection, but also 
the requirement of reciprocal treatment combine to create a monopoly for 
the European database industries, 3 promoting the interest of defending its 
local industries from foreign competition. Such a protectionist regime 
produces a number of negative effects, among which are restricting "free 
competition" and turning one particular region's free trade into another 
country's economic exploitation; this is especially true in developing 
countries with fragile economies and limited resources. The system of 
the free flow of trade, which is championed by Adam Smith's theory of 
the "invisible hand," the self-interested actions of both consumers and 
producers to promote an optimal economic and social outcome, should 
be maintained. 4 Regulating the sui generis right is an irresponsible ac-
tion of the European Union, an attempt to steal knowledge wealth from 
other countries. 
comparative advantage is all too often presented only in its mathematical form. Using 
numerical examples or diagrammatic representations are extremely useful in demonstrat-
ing the basic results and the deeper implications of the theory. However, it is also easy to 
see the results mathematically, without ever understanding the basic intuition of the the-
ory. 
2. The Legal Protection of Databases, WIPO Doc. SCCR/8/8, at 3 (Nov. 4, 2002) (submis-
sion by the European Community to the Standing Committee on Copyrights and Related Rights). 
The sui generis protection of databases has proven to fulfill the economic expectations. 
Since the entry into force of the Database Directive, the European CD-ROM and online 
markets have grown at enormous rates. A large number of new database products have 
been made available in Europe, many of which have been produced by small and me-
dium-sized enterprises. 
3. Council Directive 96/9/EC, arts. 10(3),11(3), 1996 OJ. (L 77) 20 [hereinafter Database 
Directive]. 
4. CHRIS ROHMANN, A WORLD OF IDEAS; A DICTIONARY OF IMPORTANT THEORIES, 
CONCEPTS, BELIEFS AND THINKERS 247 (1999). 
In a free market, prices, quantities, and production methods are governed by the forces of 
Supply and Demand. When the price of a good is stable because the supply of it matches 
the demand for it, the market for that good is said to be in equilibrium. The invisible 
hand is not infallible, however; unemployment, inflation, and the adverse unintended 
consequences of economic activity (know to economists as "negative externalities") are 
examples of market failure. In these situations, government often steps in, creating sub-
sidies, regulations, public-sector industries, taxes, and other mechanisms to correct or 
avoid the malfunction. Government intervention in free market economies also typically 
includes antitrust laws, tax incentives to encourage certain kinds of investment, and inter-
est-rate manipulation. 
2
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This article explores important economic mechanisms and competition 
law that have been used to promote the competitiveness of the database 
industries. Section II explains fundamental economic theories that lead 
to an understanding of the concept of an efficient and perfect competition 
within the database industries. Section III analyzes judicial decisions of 
the two economic parties, the European Union and the United States of 
America, that apply competition law to create a fair reproduction and 
dissemination of factual contents and to prevent unfair competition de-
rived from an attempt to dominate the free flow of contents in the mar-
ket. Section IV examines a concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction that 
the courts in the E.U. and the U.S. have utilized to assert extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over activities that are constituted outside their borders. Sec-
tion V addresses the concept of economic invisible hands and the compe-
tition laws that are sufficient to promote market efficiency and a com-
petitive advantage for the worldwide database industry. 
II. RELATION OF FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC MECHANISM, 
COMPETITION, AND THE PROTECTION OF SUI GENERIS 
DATABASES 
Whatever its choice of economic systems and national policies, a gov-
ernment adopts basic economic principles to promote the competitive-
ness of its markets, and uses legal measures to support market activities. 5 
Generally, there are two fundamental economic theories that the gov-
ernment takes in consideration. One is "Demand-Supply," which ex-
plains the concept of price motivation between producers and consumers 
in the market and the other is "Profit Maximization," which explains the 
competition between players based on the concept of price motivation. 
A. DEMAND-SUPPLY 
Together, Demand and Supply motivate market activities. The theory of 
Demand-Supply is based on the relationship between suppliers and con-
sumers in the market. "Supply" (ceteris paribus) is an ability and will-
ingness to sell specific quantities of goods at alternative prices in a given 
time period. 6 "Demand" (ceteris paribus), in contrast, is an ability and 
willingness to buy specific quantities of goods at alternative prices in a 
given time period. 7 Both Demand and Supply magnify each other, ren-
5. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 2 (1962). "Government is necessary to 
preserve freedom, ... Its major function must be to protect our freedom both from the enemies out-
side our gates and from our fellow citizens: to preserve law and order, to enforce private contracts, to 
foster competitive markets." 
6. BRAD R. SCHILLER, THE ECONOMY TODAY (8th ed., 2000). 
7. [d. 
3
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dering market behavior. If there is high demand by consumers for a spe-
cific product in the market, the increase in demand will cause the price of 
the product to be increased as well. Once the demand is greater than the 
supply, prices will rise and that price motivation may tempt new suppli-
ers to produce that specific product and move into a market already 
dominated by a few suppliers. In contrast, if suppliers over-produce a 
specific product, the supply becomes greater than the demand. Then 
prices will drop and become more competitive and consumers will bene-
fit from the competition between the suppliers offering that product. 
B. PROFIT MAxIMIZATION AND MAXIMIZING BEHAVIOR 
Profit Maximization explains the natural market behavior that leads to 
competition. In a perfect market environment, the Profit Maximization is 
the most profitable rate of output which is indicated by the intersection of 
marginal revenue and marginal cost or where marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost. 8 This means a firm maximizes profit when it could sell a 
single item of a specific product and gain the profit at the cost of produc-
ing it. Consequently, the maximized profit, which becomes profit incen-
tive, stimulates competition in the market. Any firm would want to enter 
into a market that has already been dominated by the original player. 
The economists describe this kind of behavior as a "Maximizing Behav-
ior."9 
Maximizing Behavior applies to all market participants. Consumers 
come with a limited amount of income to spend.1O They wish to buy the 
most desirable goods and services that their limited budgets will permit. 
However, they cannot afford everything they want, so they must make 
choices about how to spend their scarce dollars. Their goal is to maxi-
mize the utility (satisfaction) they get from their available incomes. 
Businesses come to the marketplace with a quest to maximize profits. 11 
They try to use resources efficiently and lower the cost of production, or 
even to have legal protections reduced or increased in order to maximize 
the profit. The public sector also has a maximizing goal called "welfare 
maximization." 12 Government has to use available resources to serve 
and maximize the public need. Thus, the resources available for this 
purpose are finite. Hence local, state, and federal governments must use 
scarce resources carefully, striving to maximize the general welfare of 
society. 
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The above-mentioned economic theories can be directly applied to mar-
ket activities of the database industries. In a perfect market environment, 
the theories of Demand-Supply and Maximizing Behavior act together to 
explain market behavior in relation to price mechanism. If the prices of 
database goods and services are not too high, the demand of consumers 
will increase. The increasing demand, consequently, motivates the data-
base compilers or makers to produce more products or services to supply 
the market. Price mechanism will motivate subsequent compilers to en-
ter into the market that already has been captured by the original players. 
This is because the subsequent database makers foresee how they can 
maximize profit at the cost of producing one additional unit. Some data-
base makers even enter further into their "market opportunity" by devel-
oping better and cheaper databases to supply the market. In this sense, 
the competition flourishes. Vice versa, if the prices increase, the demand 
of consumers will drop. The consumers will opt out for a product offer-
ing with an alternative price. 
Every relationship in the market is determined by the price mechanism. 
The databases, ranging from hard products (CD-ROM or compilations) 
to soft products (online database services), will be consumed if the costs 
are not too high for the consumer to afford. At this point, the market 
price of databases will not rise above or equal the marginal price. This is 
because no firm may charge more than another; any attempt by a single 
firm to raise a price would result in a loss of sales as buyers opt for a 
lower priced product. On the other hand, if the market price drops below 
a producer's marginal cost, the producer will not gain enough revenue 
from the sale of a unit to cover his expenses in producing an item. Con-
sequently, he will ultimately be forced to drop out of the competition in 
the market. 
Any subsequent database maker will be tempted to enter into the market 
that is already dominated by the original databases makers if there is an 
equal market opportunity. They may use different business strategies to 
attract consumers, including product improvement and development. 
However, competition would flourish only if the underlying data is free 
to the subsequent compilers so they are not forced to start from scratch 
by doing a survey and rediscovering the same data. Legal measures, if 
any, should be provided to subsidize competition, but not to eliminate the 
subsequent compilers from the market or to allow the original database 
makers to dictate supply and price. 
5
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According to D' Amato and Long, copyright protection constitutes a tem-
porary monopoly over reproduction and dissemination of expressive con-
tents. \3 They explained that an author of creative works generally ob-
tains exclusive rights which would create a temporary monopoly by way 
of a lengthy duration of protection, the author's life plus fifty years. 14 
Through a licensing scheme, the consumers pay more than they should 
for licensing products. 15 The subsequent compilers will be reluctant to 
incur the costs by starting from scratch and entering a market or absorb-
ing monopolistic prices of copyrighted items. 16 Although they did not 
mention any applicable economic theory in connection with the factual 
contents, they appear to support the idea that copyright law maintains a 
proper balance, providing an incentive to the authors and promoting the 
public free flow of access to information, by stating: "The limit is impor-
tant because the purpose of copyright is not solely to reward authors, but 
rather to induce production at the minimum possible cost to society. The 
law, by limiting the ownership of data, thus, favors its free movement 
and therefore contributes to the general progress of society."17 They 
emphasized that a government's granting of protection of any kind 
should neither limit the public access to information nor avail any private 
entity an absolute monopoly window in information goods and services. 
13. ANTHONY D'AMATO & DORIS ESTELLE LONG, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ANTHOLOGY; UNDERLYING THEORIES 54 (1996). 
In a desire to reward the author, and hence encourage production of new works, copyright 
essentially grants the author a monopoly over the reproduction and dissemination of his 
creative expression for a limited period of time. Thus, copyright is also a tax to society, 
because the author may set the price he chooses for the work, though the work faces po-
tential substitution if the price is too high and buyers opt instead for other, similar 
works." 
See also, SCHILLER, supra note 6, at 496. 
A "monopoly" situation is when a firm produces the entire market supplies of a particular 
good and service ... Although monopolies simplify the geometry, they complicate the 
arithmetic of profit maximization. In theory, this special adaptation of the profit-
maximizing rule does not work for a monopolist. The demand curve facing a monopolist 
is downward-sloping. Because of this, marginal revenue is not equal to price for a mo-
nopolist. On the contrary, marginal revenue is always less than price in a monopoly, 
which makes it just a bit more difficult to find the profit-maximizing rate of output. 
14. D'AMATO & loNG, supra note 13, at 54. "In order to protect the copyright holder while 
mitigating the burden of his monopoly on his competitors and customers, the protection is limited to 
creative expression for a specific period of time." 
15. Id. "Competition is prohibited from copying expressions without the author's consent. To 
produce new works, competitors must pay to license, or they must start from scratch." 
16. Id. 
17. Id. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 
TEx. L. REv. 989, 1014 (1997). 
Copyright protection does not extend to the ideas, facts, or functional elements of a work, 
but only to the author's original expression of those ideas or elements. Thus, a copyright 
owner in a database of facts cannot prevent a user from copying the facts themselves 
from the database. Only the creative effort (if any) that has gone into the selection or or-
ganization of material is entitled to protection. 
6
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In contrast, the European Union's creation of sui generis protection, con-
stitutes a monopoly by means of its perpetual duration of protection. In 
reference to the Database Directive, it specifies two-tiered protection, 
one attached to the creative selection and arrangement of the content of 
databases and the other to the factual or data content. 18 The sui generis 
system provides the database makers an ownership right to prevent the 
unauthorized extraction and/or reutilization of both creative and factual 
contents of databases for commercial purposes and unlimited duration of 
protection if the database makers show that there is substantial change in 
the databases. 19 This is convincing evidence that the regime of sui 
generis databases is not unjustifiable per se. 
D. JUSTIFIABLE ECONOMIC CONCEPT OF COMPETITION 
Competition, in an economic context, can be referred to as the actions of 
two or more rivals in pursuit of the same objective. 20 In the context of 
markets, the specific objective is either selling goods to buyers or alter-
natively buying goods from sellers. 21 In a system of perfect competition, 
there would be a number of sellers, a number of buyers, and perfect mar-
ket information available to all. 22 The sellers, competing among them-
selves for business, would be induced to make and provide what their 
customers want. To do so they would aspire to be inventive and progres-
sive and to minimize costs. The pressures of competition would keep 
prices near costs. 
However, the process of competition may result in one firm dominating 
the market. Competition between firms may produce a "winner" which 
dominates the market, or a "national" monopoly may exist on the mar-
ket. 23 A firm with sustained monopoly power would have an incentive to 
18. Database Directive, supra note 3, arts. 3 & 7. 
19. [d. art. 10(3). 
20. AREEDA KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 5 (5th ed., 1997). 
21. [d. 
22. [d. at 6. 
A market economy will be perfectly competitive if the following conditions hold: 
(I) Sellers and buyers are so numerous that no one's action can have a per-
ception impact on the market price, and there is no collusion among buyers 
and sellers. 
(2) Consumers register their subjective preferences among various goods 
and services through market transactions at fully known market prices. 
(3) All relevant prices are known to each producer, who also knows of all 
input combinations technically capable of producing any specific combination 
of outputs and who makes input-output decisions solely to maximize profits. 
(4) Every producer has equal access to all input markets and there are no ar-
tificial barriers to the production of any product. 
23. ROHMANN, supra note 4, at 71. "The economic theory of competition spans a continuum, 
from perfect competition, in which many sellers offer the same product under the same circum-
stances, to monopoly, in which a product is available from only one source, which therefore has no 
7
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act inefficiently, which could involve letting costs rise; to use their power 
to exploit consumers; and to strike down competitors to preserve its mo-
nopoly in the market. Such activities constitute an economic inefficiency 
in the market and restrain competition. In these situations, it may be 
necessary for a governmental body to take certain measures to restrain 
the dominating firms' behavior. 
Competition law, therefore, exists to protect the process of competition 
in a free market economy.24 Competition law embodies legal measures 
that the government adopts in accordance with the form of economic 
organization which brings the greatest benefits to society. 25 To foster 
diversity and pluralism, competition law seeks to promote effective and 
undistorted competition in the market. The basis of free competition 
between firms is believed to deliver efficiency, low prices, and innova-
tion. Competition and competition law that serves the market economy 
tend to keep markets free and open, thereby providing opportunities for 
entrepreneurs and their small- and medium-sized enterprises. 26 
In perfect competition, the welfare of consumers should be maximized. 
Under this perfect competitive environment, the consumers determine 
the amount of economic resources available, which maximizes the effi-
ciency of the market. The cost of the production of goods and services 
will be as low as possible because the undertakings need to remain com-
petitive. The prices remain low as a function of the mechanics of supply 
and demand. 
competition. Both of these model circumstances are rare; more common are atomistic and monopo-
listic competition and oligopoly." 
24. ELEANOR M. Fox, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 801 (2002). 
Many analysts assume that a system of free enterprise with competition law exists only to 
obtain a more efficient allocation of resources or only to prevent price rises to consumers 
and that competition law has exactly and only this goal. Of course, as we have seen, that 
is not the case. Competition law usually has other goals as well. In the European Union, 
these goals include market integration, openness, control of dominance, fairness, and 
competitiveness (the growth of efficient, dynamic and responsive fInns for the sake of the 
European economic strength in world markets). 
25. ALISON JONES AND BRENDA SUFRIN, EC COMPETITION LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS 3 (200 I). 
26. Andres Guadamuz Gonzales, The Impact oj Globalization on Competition Law 6-7 (2002) 
at <http://www .democraciadigital.orgl etc/arts/020 I global.html>. 
It would appear that the rationale behind competition law is very complex. It exists to 
protect the consumer, it also protects smaller enterprises from preying practices of power-
ful undertakings, it protects the economy, and it is also benefIcial for the "common good" 
of society. Whatever reason, it can be argued that the goal of competition policy is to fInd 
a balance with a market which no undertaking is allowed to become too dominant. 
8
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Inasmuch as perfect competition is an ideal set forth by a theory, reality 
is often different. The reality is that monopolies do occur. Whereas the 
WIPO Draft Database Treaty, like other intellectual property laws, tends 
to create a monopoly window for the database makers, giving them an 
ability to control prices and production, competition law, in a given soci-
ety in Europe or in the United States, tends to promote market efficiency 
and competition in the databases industries. There is existing evidence 
of how the courts in the E.U. and the U.S. apply competition law to sup-
port competition in the database industries. 
A. THE POSITION OF E.U. COMPETITION LAW 
Member States of the European Union have utilized competition law to 
enhance economic efficiency and social development in their common 
internal market. Every year the Competition Directorate publishes a 
report27 that reexamines the objectives of Community competition policy 
to be in compliance with Articles 81 (ex 85) and 82( ex 86) of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community of 1957 (E.C. Treaty).28 In short, 
Article 81 (1) declares that agreements that distort competition are in-
compatible with the common market;29 Article 81(2) declares such 
27. FOx, supra note 24, 784-787. Referring to the XXXth Report on Competition Policy 
(2000), '\II states: 
Competition Policy is one of the pillars of the European Commission's action in the eco-
nomic field. This action is founded on the principle, enshrined in the Treaty, of "an open 
market economy with free competition." It acknowledges the fundamental role of the 
market and of competition in guaranteeing consumer welfare, in encouraging the opti-
mum allocation of resources and in granting economic agents the appropriate incentives 
to pursue productive efficiency, quality, and innovation. 
See also, TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY [hereinafter EC Treaty] arts. 81-82 
(as amended); the XXIXth Report on Competition Policy (1999) '\I 2 states: "The First objective of 
competition policy is the maintenance of competitive markets. Competition policy serves as an 
instrument to encourage industrial efficiency, the optimal allocation of resources, technical progress 
and the flexibility to adjust to a changing environment;" and the XXVIth Report on Competition 
Policy (1996), '\12 states: 
Competition policy is both a Commission policy in its own right and an integral part of a 
large number of European Union policies and with them seeks to achieve the Community 
objectives set out in Article 2 of the Treaty, including the promotion of harmonization 
and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary 
growth which respects the environment, a high level of employment and of social protec-
tion, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social co-
hesion. 
28. EC TREATY, Nov. 10, 1997, OJ. (C 340) 3 (1997). 
29. Id. art. 81(1). 
The Following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agree-
ments between undertakings, decisions, by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object 
9
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agreements void;30 and Article 81(3) allows exemption for such agree-
ments or practices that are economically progressive and benefit con-
sumers.31 Article 82 prohibits abuse of a dominant position.32 In addi-
tion, the European Parliament and its Commission are bound to promote 
balance and sustain economic and social progress in the Community and 
in other areas as well: merger control,33 liberalization and state interven-
tion,34 and state aid. 35 
In Radio Telejis Eireann v. Commission (Magill),36 the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) held that a refusal to license copyright in factual con-
or effect the prevention, restriction or distribution of competition within the common 
market, and in particular those which: 
(a) direct or indirect fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading condi-
tions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties 
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commer-
cial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
30. Id. art. 81 (2). "Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be 
automatically void." 
31. Id. art. 81 (3). 
The provisions of paragraph I may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: 
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings; 
-any decision or category of decision by associations of undertakings; 
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices; 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or promoting 
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit, and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indis-
pensable to the attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in re-
spect of a substantial part of the products in question. 
32. Id. art. 82. 
Any abuse one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market 
or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market 
in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse, in particular, consist 
in: 
(a) direct or indirect imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other un-
fair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice 
of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trad-
ing parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
33. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings. 
34. EC TREATY arts. 37 & 90. 
35. Id. arts. 90, 92-94. 
36. Case C-241-24J/91 P, RTE & ITP v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, [1995] 6 C.M.L.R. 
718 (1995). 
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tents infringed Article 82 of the E.C. Treaty. The ECJ upheld the Com-
mission's decision in Magill TV Guide v. Independent Television Publi-
cations Ltd. (lTP), British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC) and Radio 
Telefis Eireann Authority (RTE).37 The Commission of the European 
Communities (Commission) held that the policies and practices ofITP, 
BBC and RTE, respectively, in relation to their individual advance 
weekly program listings, constituted infringements of Article 82.38 Each 
broadcasting organization published weekly listings of its programs in 
Ireland and North Ireland, gave newspapers its schedule free on a daily 
basis (according to strictly enforced licensing conditions),39 and claimed 
copyright protection over its program listings. Therefore, RTE had statu-
tory monopoly over television broadcasting in Ireland,40 whereas BBC 
and ITP had a statutory duopoly in the U.K. (including Northern Ire-
land).41 At that time, no composite TV guide existed. An Irish pub-
lisher, Magill, started to publish a comprehensive weekly TV guide giv-
ing details of all programs available to viewers in Ireland and Northern 
Ireland. It sought licenses from RTE, BBC and ITP but the licenses were 
denied. 42 Magill complained to the Commission that the television com-
panies, by refusing to give out reliable advance listings information and 
protecting their listing by enforcing their copyright, were infringing Arti-
cle 82. 
In the finding, the relevant product market43 was identified in view of the 
potential demand for weekly TV guides. The products to be taken into 
account were the advance weekly listings of ITP and BBC regional pro-
gram services and those of R TE and also the TV guides in which these 
37. Commission Decision 8912051EEC, relating to a proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC 
Treaty (IV/31.85 1- Magill TV Guide/ITP, BBe and RTE), 1988 OJ. (L 78) 43; [1989]4 C.M.L.R. 
755 (1989). 
38. Id. art. I. 
39. Id. ~ 15. 
40. Id. ~ 2. 
41. Id. ~~ 3-4. 
42. Id. ~ 5. 
43. Commission Notice on the Defmition of the Relevant Market, 1997 O.J. C 372/5 II. 
A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which are re-
garded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products' 
characteristics, their prices and their intended use... The relevant geographic market 
comprises the area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and 
demand of products or services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently 
homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighboring areas because the condi-
tions of competition are appreciably different in those areas... The relevant market 
within which to assess a given competition issue is therefore established by the combina-
tion of the product and geographic markets. The Commission interprets the definitions at 
paragraph 7 and 8 (which reflects the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice and the Court 
of First Instance as well as its own decisional practice) according to the orientations de-
fmed in this Notice. 
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listings were published. 44 For a publisher wishing to produce a weekly 
TV guide for the geographic area, these listings constituted the essential 
raw materials for any such guide. 45 The individual listings were not in-
terchangeable with one another but instead were complementary to one 
another, as they concerned different programs. 46 Accordingly, the con-
sumers experienced this difficulty and demanded that this information be 
contained in a single periodical, that is, a comprehensive guide.47 
On the other hand, the relevant geographic market was determined by the 
common characteristic of where the weekly listings could be received 
and where TV guides containing these listings were distributed. 48 The 
RTE program service was received in most, if not all, of Ireland and 
Northern Ireland. 49 The BBC and ITP program services, or at least re-
gional versions of these services, were also received in this area. 50 Any 
comprehensive weekly TV guide, therefore, would contain at least the 
weekly listings for these regional services. Consequently, the relevant 
geographic market was most of Ireland and Northern Ireland, which con-
stituted a substantial part of the common market for the purpose of Arti-
cle 82. 
The Commission provided an analysis of the existence of dominant posi-
tion. First, the existence of a dominant position was found in accordance 
with the nature of subject matter in this case. 51 The broadcasting organi-
zations' listings were entitled to national copyright protection of the 
United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland, which was contrary to the con-
cept of copyright protection elsewhere in the Community. 52 This case 
appeared to be a battle between intellectual property rights and competi-
tion law. Insofar as the dominant position is concerned, it is to be re-
membered at the outset that mere ownership of an intellectual property 
right cannot confer a monopoly position. 53 Since the broadcasting or-
ganizations legitimately obtained copyright protection on their listings, 
they had a monopoly over their reproduction and distribution. 54 Any 
third parties who wished to produce reliable listings for publication in 
their own TV guide must obtain licenses from the broadcasting organiza-




48. Id. ~ 21. 
49. Id 
50. Id 
51. Id ~~ 8-9. 
52. Id 
53. Id 
54. Id ~23. 
12
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 11 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol11/iss1/8
2005] SUI GENERIS DATABASES 153 
tions, resulting in the ability of the license-holding organizations to con-
trol competition from third parties in the markets. 55 The broadcasting 
organizations, thus, were in a position to prevent effective competition in 
the market of weekly television magazines and, therefore, occupied a 
dominant position. 
Second, the existence of abuse of Article 82 was found in relation to the 
broadcasting organizations' actual policies and practices. 56 ITP, BBC, 
and RTE had policies to supply publishers with their advance weekly 
listings but to limit, by means of the terms of licenses granted, the repro-
duction of these listings to one or, at most, two days' listings at a time. 
Another option was to refuse to license altogether. 57 The Commission 
took a view that these policies and practices were unduly restrictive to 
the competition by preventing the appearance of a new product for which 
there was a potential consumer demand. 58 Instead, their conduct re-
served the secondary market of weekly TV guides to themselves by ex-
cluding competition through the denial of access to the basic information 
that was the indispensable raw material for the compilation of such 
guides. 59 In addition, the Commission asserted that such abuse also had 
effect on trade between Member States because a comprehensive TV 
guide containing the advance weekly listings of ITP, BBC and RTE 
would clearly be marketed in both Ireland and Northern Ireland, which 
would include cross-border trade in such guides. 6O In conclusion, the 
Commission considered that the practices and policies of broadcasting 
organizations were prohibited under Article 82 because, in fact, they 
used copyright as an instrument of abuse, and in a manner that fell out-
side the scope of the specific subject-matter of that intellectual property 
right, and by acting in a dominant position to prevent the introduction of 
a new product, the weekly TV guide, to the market. 61 The Commission's 
decision was also upheld by the Court of First InstanceY 
Only RTE and ITP appealed to the ECJY The ECJ confmned the find-






60. Id. ~ 24. 
61. Id. art. I. 
62. Case T-69/70/89, 76/89, RTE, ITP, SSC v. Commission 1991 E.C.R. 11-485, [1991] 4 
C.M.L.R. 586 (Ct. First Instance 1991). 
63. Case C-241-241191 P, RTE & ITP v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, [1995)6 C.M.L.R. 
718 (1995). 
64. Id. ~~ 46-58. 
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the specific scenario in issue and eschewed extended discussion about 
the nature of intellectual property rights and their relationship to the rules 
of competition. 6S The ECJ stated: 
The appellants-who were, by force of circumstances, the only 
sources of the basic information on programme scheduling 
which is the indispensable raw material for compiling a weekly 
television guide-gave viewers wishing to obtain information on 
the choice of programmes for the week ahead "no choice" but to 
buy the weekly guides for each station and draw from each of 
them the information they needed to make comparisons.66 
In conclusion, the ECJ held that the refusal to supply information that 
was the raw material necessary for the weekly TV listings constituted an 
abuse under Article 82(b) of the E.C. Treaty by means of preventing the 
appearance of a new product that the appellants did not offer but for 
which there was a potential consumer demand. 67 
The Commission had been concerned that dominant undertakings should 
not hinder competition from producing products and services. The deci-
sion in the Magill case had proved that a refusal to license intellectual 
property rights under Article 82 of the E.c. Treaty would affect the com-
petition of the database industry. Pursuant to the Database Directive, 
recital 47 mentioned: 
Whereas, in the interests of competition between suppliers of in-
formation products and services, protection by the sui generis 
right must not be afforded in such a way as to facilitate abuses of 
a dominant position, in particular as regards the creation and dis-
tribution of new products and services which have an intellec-
tual, documentary, technical, economic or commercial added 
value; whereas, therefore, the provisions of this Directive are 
without prejudice to the application of Community or national 
competition rules. 68 
It raises an important question of how far the sui generis right under the 
Database Directive regime could promote free competition. Inasmuch as 
it constitutes a property right in the factual contents, the concept of pro-
tection directly opposes the copyright rationale of the public free flow of 
65. [d. ~ 46. 
66. [d. ~ 53. 
67. [d. ~ 54. 
68. Database Directive, supra note 3, at Recital 47. 
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acc~ss to information. Moreover, it violates international treaties to 
which Member States are parties, especially the Berne Convention and 
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms. 69 The action of institutions applying and enforcing the Commu-
nity law must respect the general principles of law, in particular, the 
principles of proportionality, legitimate expectations, and fundamental 
rights. 70 To this point, it is important that when administering Commu-
nity law, the Commission must ensure that such law is in compliance 
with the principles of human rights, rules of natural justice, and "interna-
tional comity" (living peacefully with other nations in mutual respect and 
accommodating their interests, the rules of politeness, convenience, and 
goodwill observed by States in their mutual intercourse without being 
legally bound by them). 71 
B. THE POSITION OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAW 
The first country in which antirust law took a firm legislative foothold 
was the United States. Since 1890, the U.S. courts have applied the 
Sherman Act to prohibit the existence of monopolies, conspiracies be-
tween companies, and lowering prices to eliminate smaller competitors. 72 
Insofar as it concerned a healthy U.S. economy, the Sherman Act was 
very effective in creating a system of punishment by providing private 
individuals a way to recover "treble damages" for breaches of the anti-
trust law. 73 In regard to the compilations of facts and information, the 
U.S. courts applied the doctrine of "misappropriation" to promote com-
petition of the database industry in addition to the doctrine of "sweat of 
the brow." 
69. JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 25, at 66-67. 
The ECJ has developed and introduced a body of unwritten law, the general principles of 
law, as part of Community law. These are rules, based on national laws of Member States 
and international treaties, especially the European Convention of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, in accordance with which Community law is interpreted. The princi-
ples are important when determining the boundaries of proper and lawful action of the 




72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. 
73. Id.; see also, KAPLOW, supra note 20, at 106-107. 
Although antitrust laws are of general application, covering all industries and virtually all 
economic activity, several "exemptions" have arisen over the years. We use the quoted 
term loosely to cover quite different limitations on the reach of the antitrust laws. There 
are literal exemptions by which statutes expressly allow certain conduct-for example, 
by agriculture cooperatives or by labor unions-that would otherwise violate the antitrust 
laws ... In addition, the courts have assumed that Congress meant to respect principles of 
federalism by leaving "state action" outside the antitrust regime. Finally, the federal anti-
trust laws apply only where interstate and foreign commerce are involved, although ap-
plying U.S. law to foreign activity creates special difficulty. 
15
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In International News Service V. Associated Press (INS V. AP),74 the 
U.S. Supreme Court applied the doctrine of misappropriation to compila-
tions of facts or data in news. According to the underlying fact, during 
the First World War, the INS and AP were competitors engaging in the 
same business conduct, news services. 7s Both gathered and published 
news about wars from abroad secured from foreign governments. 76 
However, AP was barred from sources in some countries and began to 
pirate its competitor's news from INS's bulletin boards. 77 INS filed the 
suit, alleging that AP had misappropriated its news and sought for an 
injunction against its rival agency. The District Court granted the sum-
mary judgment in favor of AP and withheld the injunction. 78 On appeal, 
the Appellate Court reversed the decision, issued the injunction, and re-
strained AP from taking or gainfully using any of INS's news by means 
of the commercial value attached to the news. 79 The Supreme Court af-
firmed the reasoning that INS still had commercial interest in the news it 
gathered. 
Applying the doctrine of misappropriation, Justice Pitney delivered the 
leading opinion directed to the owner's commercial or economic interest 
in the commercial data or information. The Court pointed out that gath-
ered information about events of public interest was not "susceptible of 
ownership or dominion in the absolute sense."80 The gatherers had no 
right against the public at large and could not generally prohibit use of 
the information because news was "common property."81 Nevertheless, 
the gatherers could obtain a right to restrain use of such news if there was 
a commercial rival between the complainant and the defendant. In this 
sense, the news must be regarded as "quasi-property"82 that had all at-
tributes necessary to determine a misappropriation. INS, then, could pro-
hibit its competitors from using it "until its commercial value as news 
has passed away."83 The Court found that AP's conduct was an endeavor 
to reap where it had not sown and amounted to an unauthorized interfer-
ence to INS's legitimate business at the point where its profit was to be 
74. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 63 1. Ed. 211, 39 S. Ct. 68 
(1918). 





80. [d. at 236. 
81. [d. at 235. 
82. Jd. at 236. 
83. [d. at 240. 
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reaped.84 AP should be prohibited from taking news from the INS bulle-
tin board. Otherwise, no news service could stay in business. 
The Court laid down elements central to INS's claim as follows: (1) the 
plaintiff generated or collected information at some cost or expense;85 (2) 
the value of information was highly time-sensitive;86 (3) defendant's use 
of information constituted free-riding on the plaintiff's costly efforts to 
generate or collect it;87 (4) the defendant's use of information was in 
direct competition with a product or service offered by the plaintiff;88 and 
(5) the ability of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff 
would so reduce the incentive to produce the product or service that its 
existence or quality would be substantially threatened. 89 AP's conduct 
would render INS's publication profitless or of so little profit as to in 
effect cut off the service by rendering the cost prohibitive in comparison 
with the return. 
Further, the Court reasoned that INS v. AP was about the protection of 
property rights in time-sensitive information so that the information 
could be made available to the public by profit-seeking entrepreneurs. If 
services like INS were not assured of property rights in the news they 
pay to collect, they would cease to collect it. The ability of competitors 
to appropriate their product at only nominal cost and thereby to dissemi-
nate a competing product at a lower price would destroy the incentive to 
collect news in the first place. 
It appeared that the Court recognized a property right in such facts and 
information. However, the Court did not mention that the gathered news 
was copyrightable, it only referred to the gathered facts and information 
as "quasi property." Though the news was realized as "common prop-
erty" belonging to the public, the Court applied the doctrine of misap-
propriation, reasoning that the gatherer still had a commercial interest in 
the contents and prevented INS from getting a free ride. The Court's 
decision responded to the economic significance and interest of the gath-
erer in gathered facts and information. 
In recent developments, the U.S. court appears to be more sophisticated 
and provides a more satisfactory analysis of the doctrine of misappro-
priation in relation to databases. In National Basketball Association v. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. /d. at 231. 
87. Id. at 239-240. 
88. Id. at 240. 
89. Id. at 241. 
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Motorola, Inc. (NBA v. Motorola),9O the Second Circuit held that Mo-
torola did not free-ride on NBA's product since it expended its own re-
sources to collect purely factual information. Motorola manufactured and 
marketed the SportsTrax paging device while Sports Team Analysis and 
Tracking Systems (ST A TS) supplied the game information that was 
transmitted to the pagers, such as the teams that were playing, score 
changes, and the time remaining in the quarter. 91 NBA filed in the 
Southern District of New York on the grounds of misappropriation and 
sought an injunction to bar the sale of a handheld pager that displayed 
updated scores and statistical information of National Basketball Asso-
ciation games.92 The District Court found that Motorola and STATS 
were liable for misappropriation. 93 The Second Circuit reversed the de-
CISIOn. 
In its finding, the Second Circuit outlined elements of the doctrine of 
misappropriation as follows: (1) the subject matter must result from 
plaintiff's own contribution, expenses, and labor in generating or collect-
ing information; (2) the information was time sensitive; (3) the defen-
dant's use of the information must constitute free-riding status; (4) the 
defendant's use of the information was in competition with a product or 
service offered by the plaintiff or likely to be offered by the plaintiff; and 
(5) the ability of other parties to free ride on the efforts of the plaintiff 
would so reduce the incentive to produce the product or service that the 
existence or equality of the product would be substantially threatened. 94 
The Second Circuit found that Motorola had not engage in unlawful mis-
appropriation because the information transmitted to SportsTrax was not 
precisely contemporaneous, but was, in fact, time sensitive. 95 Besides, 
the NBA failed to show any competitive effect from SportsTrax on the 
following grounds: first, the product was generating the information by 
playing the games; second, the product was transmitting live, full de-
scriptions of those games; and third, the product was collecting and re-
transmitting strictly factual information about the games.96 The Court 
also found that the NBA' s primary product-producing basketball games 
with live attendance and licensing copyrighted broadcasts of those 
games-was not infringed upon nor did it involve a free-ride, inasmuch 
as Motorola markets SportsTrax as being designed for those times when 
a person could not be at the arena, watch the game on TV, or listen to it 
90. National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F. 3d 841 (2nd Cir. 1997). 
91. Id at 844. 
92. Id 
93. Id 
94. Id at 845. 
95. Id at 853. 
96. Id at 854. 
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on the radio. 97 In addition, the Court asserted that the transmitted con-
tents of live events such as baseball games were not copyrightable and, 
therefore, survived the Copyright Act's preemptive effect. 98 U.S. law 
extends copyright protection only to an author's creative expressions, not 
to facts or information. 
Evidently, U.S. courts extend antitrust law to constitute a property right 
in factual contents and to promote market efficiency in the database in-
dustry. The decisions in both cases indicate an intention to recognize the 
economic significance of databases and resolve the problem of free-
riding. However, unlike INS v. AP, the decision in the NBA v. Motorola 
is based on the fact that there are different relevant markets. Under the 
NBA scenario, the market would be competitive since the underlying 
information remains free for all to access. On the other hand, the Court 
in INS v. AP utilizes antitrust law to prevent free-riding of the gathered 
facts and to secure the investment of the gatherer. Under the INS v. AP 
scenario, only a handful of database compilers would remain in the mar-
ket as they would obtain exclusive owner rights over the factual contents 
of databases. The subsequent compilers would not have an incentive to 
start collecting the same data from scratch and enter into a market al-
ready dominated by the original players. Consumers would have limited 
alternatives of product selections. The market would not be freely com-
petitive as the authority's grant would create a temporarily monopoly 
status to the database industries. Lastly, both cases refer to compiled 
facts that copyright law does not afford protection over unless there is 
minimal creativity in the selection and arrangement of the contents. INS 
v. AP refers to this type of work as a quasi property based on labor justi-
fications corresponding to the doctrine of sweat of the brow, whereas 
NBA v. Motorola mentions that compiled facts are not copyrightable 
corresponding to the true copyright regime that the U.S. ratified in the 
Berne Convention. 
The European approach, on the other hand, seems to be more effective 
than the U.S. approach. The Court's decision in Magill represents an 
idea to promote the public free flow of access to information, flourishing 
market competition inasmuch as the European courts consider a refusal 
to license as an abuse of dominant position. It seems that the European 
courts eliminate the temporary monopoly that copyright law allows 
through a licensing scheme, but fail to state that the factual contents are 
not copyrightable. Unlike the U.S. courts which suggest that the eco-
nomic significance of the contents to the gatherers is of prime imp or-
97. [d. 
98. [d. at 846. 
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tance, the European courts merely suggest that a refusal to license would 
impede the free movement of goods and services in the Community. 
There are a number of other differences between E.U. and U.S. competi-
tion laws that need to be addressed. First, the characteristic of the U.S. 
antitrust law is national, while the E.V. competition law is regional. 
Second, the Magill case presents a governmental authority to examine an 
existence of abuse of dominant position, but the U.S. court decisions 
present infringed parties who brought the claim before the courts on a 
ground of free-riding. 99 Last, the U.S. courts need not be concerned with 
distinct copyright law, whereas the European courts must consider the 
effect of the distinct copyright laws of the Member States and are chal-
lenged to solve problems in the national system in a way that would 
promote economic and social development in the Community as a 
whole. loo One similarity they share, however, is that both the U.S. courts 
and the European courts efficiently utilize competition law to promote 
competition in the database industries and maximize the public need of 
free access to information. 
IV. EXTRATERRITORIALITY ASPECT OF SUI GENERIS 
PROTECTION 
Within the context of competition law, the issue of extraterritoriality has 
become increasingly important as the "globalization" 101 of the world 
99. Martha Neil, Old Continent, New Deal, 90 A.B.AJ. 50, 54 (2004). "A 'philosophical gulf 
exists between American and European Union antitrust regulators. The U.S. Department of Justice 
and the Federal Trade Commission routinely focus on potential harm to consumers. EU regulators, 
on the other hand, are concerned primarily about adverse effects the merger will have on competi-
tors." 
100. JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 25, at 558. 
Common law notion of copyright emphasizes the right of author to prevent others ex-
ploiting his work for commercial gain whereas the civil law emphasizes the right of the 
creator of a work to be recognized as such and to be normally entitled to protect its integ-
rity. U.K. copyright law, for instance, covers performers' rights and similar rights but in 
most E.U. countries there is a distinction drawn between "author's right" and "neighbor-
ing rights" (those accorded to sound recordings, broadcastings, and performers). Under 
the U.K. law works created by the "sweat of the brow," such as compilations of in forma-
tion, are accorded copyright protection, whereas civil law systems require a greater de-
gree of creativity. 
101. CHARLES W. HILL, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: COMPETING IN THE GLOBAL 
MARKETPLACE 5-14 (2nd ed. 1997). 
The general understanding of the meaning of globalization is that it is a process in which 
the world is moving from a system of national economies into a trade regime where bar-
riers of different types are disappearing to create one global marketplace. It is believed 
that this process of globalization is being driven by the fall of trade and investment barri-
ers, the rapid technological advance in transportation and telecommunications, and the 
increase in direct investment of companies into third markets." 
See also ROHMANN, supra note 4, at 199. 
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economy advances. As competition takes place on a global dimension, it 
becomes more and more difficult to isolate the effects of transactions. 
For an authority to be able to assert substantive jurisdiction in antitrust 
matters,102 the jurisdiction must be one of two types afforded by interna-
tional law. On the one hand, there is what is variously called prescrip-
tive, legislative, or subject-matter jurisdiction, which is the right of States 
to make their laws applicable to persons, territories, or situations. 103 On 
the other hand, there is enforcement jurisdiction, which is the capability 
to take executive action to enforce compliance with those laws. 104 Thus, 
competition law primarily concerns how a state would assume its rights 
to take jurisdiction in respect of conduct that has affected its own terri-
tory.105 
By taking into account the whole panorama of competition law in respect 
to international law, the E.U. has, by far, the most developed regime of 
international protection for competition and it sets an example that 
should be followed.106 On the other hand, though the United States is the 
first country in which competition law set a firm legislative foothold in 
the national legal system, as Judge Wood commented, the strong U.S. 
antitrust law appears to put U.S. firms at a disadvantage in the competi-
tive battle with their foreign rivals. 107 Thus, both systems share some 
Although the contemporary political and policy know as globalism shares a suprana-
tional, nonisolationist outlook with other conceptions of internationalism, it differs from 
most of them in its emphasis on international power and influence rather than coopera-
tion. The term refers primarily to the U.S. policy of global engagement aimed at expand-
ing its political influence and economic markets, but it was also applied to the Soviet Un-
ion's efforts to extend its own sphere of influence during the Cold War. "Globalism" is 
also applied to the view that some problems, such as ozone depletion and global warm-
ing, cannot be effectively dealt with on a local or regional scale but must be attacked 
globally. 
102. JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 25, at 1049. 
On general principles, substantive jurisdiction in anti-trust matters should only be taken 
on the basis of either (a) the territorial principle, or (b) the nationality principle ... The ter-
ritorial principle justifies proceedings against foreigners and foreign companies only in 
respect of conduct which consists in whole or in part of some activity by them in the ter-
ritory of the State claiming jurisdiction ... The nationality principle justifies proceedings 
against nationals of the State claiming jurisdiction in respect of their activities abroad 
only provided that this does not involve interference with the legitimate affairs of other 
States or cause such nationals to act in a manner which is contrary to the laws of the State 
in which the activities in question are conducted. 
103. Id. at 1039. 
104. !d. 
lOS. Id. 
106. A. Paul Victor, et aI., Commentary: Antitrust and International Competitiveness in the 
1990s, 58 ANTITRUST L.1. 591 at 4 (1989). "The competition rules of the European Economic Com-
munity, set forth in Articles 95 and 86 of the treaty of Rome and implemented by the European 
Commission, are comprehensive and strong." 
107. Id. at 2-3. "The message seems inescapable: the United States, or more particularly U.S. 
fmns, have not been winning the competitive battle with their Pacific Rim, European, or other for-
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common characteristics in regard to the extraterritorial jurisdiction. The 
U.S. and the European courts adopt the principle of the effect doctrine to 
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction by conditions that (1) there are agree-
mentes) or concerted practice(s) that create a direct and immediate re-
striction of competition; (2) the effect of the conduct must be reasonably 
foreseeable; and (3) that the effect produced on the territory must be sub-
stantial. \08 Though they lack sufficient evidence of the court's decision 
in relation to the databases subject-matter, the existing court decisions 
that present an extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction should be suffi-
cient to prove an efficiency of the effect doctrine applicable to the sui 
generis databases in the global dimension. 
A. AN ASPECT OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN E.U. COMPETITION LAW 
Restrictions on competition and abusive conduct which effect trade be-
tween Member States may originate outside the Community. Foreign 
firms established outside the Community may, for example, fix prices in 
the Community or divide the common market between them. To assume 
rights to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, the ECJ must examine 
whether such behavior is anti-competitive and has an effect that impedes 
the free movement of goods and services in the Community. Examples 
of how the ECJ applies the principle of effect doctrine to assert extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction are demonstrated below. 
In Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd (ICI) V. Commission (Dyestufft) , 109 
the ECJ upheld the Commission's decision that behavior constituted a 
converted practice that was prohibited by Article 81(1) of the E.C. 
Treaty, holding that the Commission did have jurisdiction over the Brit-
ish company. 110 The Commission brought proceedings alleging that en-
terprises in six Member States and ICI, a company incorporated and hav-
ing its headquarters in the u.K., which was not at that time a member of 
the Community, had infringed Article 81(1) by means of engaging in 
eign rivals ... Both existence of strong (at least on paper) antitrust law and specific aspects of those 
laws have often been said to put U.S. finns at a disadvantage." 
108. KAPLOW, supra note 20, at 145. 
Congress responded in 1982 with the Export Trading Company Act, which leaves little 
doubt that the concern of the antitrust laws is with U.S. consumers and exporters, not for-
eign consumers or producers. The Act contains a new §7 making the Sherman Act inap-
plicable to "conduct involving ... commerce (other than import trade ... ) with foreign na-
tions-unless such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect [on 
(1) domestic or import trade or (2)]on export ... commerce ... of a person ... in the United 
States. 
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fixing prices of dyestuffs and the dye markets. III The EC] reasoned that: 
first, such behavior had direct and substantial effects in the Community 
markets as stated: 
Although parallel behavior may not by itself be identified with a 
concerted practice, it may however amount to strong evidence of 
such a practice if it leads to conditions of competition which do 
not correspond to the normal conditions of the market, having 
regard to the nature of the products, the size and number of the 
undertakings, and the volume of the said market. 112 
Second, such behavior had reasonably foreseeable effects in the Com-
munity market as stated: 
Although every producer is free to change his prices, taking into 
account in so doing the present or foreseeable conduct of his 
competitors, nevertheless it is contrary to the rules of competi-
tion contained in the Treaty for a producer to cooperate with his 
competitors, in any way whatsoever, in order to determine a co-
ordinated course of action in relation to a price increase and to 
ensure its success by prior elimination of all uncertainty as to 
each other's conduct regarding the essential elements of that ac-
tion, such as the amount, subject-matter, date and place of the in-
creases. 113 
Further, the U.K. government adopted the approach that the EC] had no 
jurisdiction and that the Commission could not exercise jurisdiction 
against a foreigner who, or a foreign company which, had committed no 
act within the Community. The EC] held that although the subsidiaries 
within the Community had separate legal personalities, it could not out-
weigh the unity of their conduct on the market for the purposes of apply-
ing the rules of competition. 114 The reality was that the ICI undertaking 
which had brought the concerted practice into legal question took place 
within the common market. 115 The issue of lacking jurisdiction raised by 
the applicants, therefore, was declared to be unfounded. 116 The subsidi-
111. ld. 
112. ld. '1166. 
113. ld. '11118. 
114. ld. '11140. 
115. ld. '11141. 
116. ld. '11142. 
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aries were merely carrying out the parent's order, so that they appeared 
as "mere extensions ofICI in the Common Market."II? 
In A Ahlstrom OsakeyhtiO v. Commission (Wood pulp) , 118 the ECJ ad-
dressed the existence of the effect doctrine in relation to the principles of 
international law. The Commission investigated alleged price-fixing in 
the wood pulp industry. It found that a cartel existed, and held that forty-
one producers and two trade associations (Finncell and KEA) had en-
gaged in concerted practices contrary to Article SI(I). All producers and 
trade associations had their registered offices outside the Community, but 
most, if not all, of the producers had branches, subsidiaries, agencies or 
other establishments within the Community. The Commission adopted 
the effect doctrine and extended the territorial scope of Article SI to un-
dertakings whose registered offices were situated outside the Community 
because the agreements to fix prices had affected trade between Member 
States and restricted competition in the Common Market. 119 
Many of the addressees appealed on two grounds that: (1) the Commis-
sion had no jurisdiction to apply its competition law to the addressees; 
and (2) they had not participated in concerted practices. The EC] as-
serted that although the main sources of supply of wood pulp were out-
side the Community, in Canada, the United States, Sweden, and Finland, 
the producers established in those countries sold directly to purchasers 
established in the Community and engaged in practices for the purpose 
of winning orders from those countries; this constituted competition 
within the Common Market. 120 It followed that the producers acted in 
concert on the prices to be charged to their customers in the Community 
and created an effect by selling at prices which were actually coordi-
nated, therefore taking part in a concerted effort which had the object and 
effect of restricting competition within the common market within the 
meaning of Article 81(1).121 Therefore, the Commission had not in-
fringed Article 81 by applying the competition rules to the individual 
undertakings. 
In addition, the applicants submitted that the Commission's decision was 
incompatible with public international law on the grounds that the use of 
the competition rules in this case was based exclusively on the economic 
repercussion within the common market. The ECJ noted that an in-
117. /d. 
118. Case C-89, 104, 114, 116-117, 125-129/85, A AhlstrOm OsakeyhtiO v. Commission, 1993 
E.C.R.I-\307. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. ~ 12. 
121. Id. ~ \3. 
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fringement of Article 81 consisted of conduct made up of two elements, 
the formation of the agreement, decision, and concerted practices; and 
the "implementation."122 It found the producers implemented their pric-
ing agreement within the common market. The Community's jurisdic-
tion to apply its competition rules to such conduct was covered by the 
territoriality principle as universally recognized in public international 
law. 123 
Further, the applicants argued on issues of the infringement of the princi-
ples of non-interference and international comity. The ECJ asserted that 
there was no need to enquire into the existence of such a rule in interna-
tional law since it was sufficient to observe that the conditions for its 
application were, in any event, not satisfied. 124 The U.S. antitrust law did 
not require export cartels to be entered into, but merely tolerated them. 125 
In addition, the United States authorities had not raised any objection 
regarding any conflict of jurisdiction when consulted by the Commission 
pursuant to the OECD Council Recommendation of 25 October 1979 
concerning Co-operation between Member Countries on Restrictive 
Business Practices affecting International Trade. 126 Accordingly, the 
ECJ rejected the argument relating to the disregard of international com-
ity raised by the applicants. 127 
It appears that the ECJ avoided mentioning the effect doctrine. Instead, 
the ECJ used the term "implementation" which meant to cover "direct 
sales" to Community purchasers and does not depend on the sellers es-
tablishing some form of marketing organization within the Commu-
nity.128 The extraterritorial jurisdiction is taken simply because of sales 
into the Community giving an impression that the "implementation" is 
similar to the effect doctrine. 
B. AN ASPECT OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN U.S. ANTIRUST LAW 
The U.S. courts confirmed that there is some extraterritorial jurisdiction 
under the Sherman Act. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America 
122. /d. ~ 16. 
123. /d. ~ 18. 
124. Id. ~ 20. 
125. Id. 
126. /d. ~21. 
127. /d. ~ 23. 
128. JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 25, at 1055. "Significantly, this judgment avoided talking 
about 'effects'. Given the terms in which the Commission decision, the arguments before the Court, 
and the Advocate General's opinion had been concluded, this avoidance of specific reference to the 
effects doctrine must have been deliberated. Instead, the Court talked about 'implementation. ", 
25
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(Alcoa),129 the Court laid down the principle of the effect doctrine to de-
termine agreements concluded outside the U.S. This case concerned a 
Canadian corporation which violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act in its 
agreement with European aluminum producers to stay out of the United 
States market. Judge Learned Hand stated that a "state may impose li-
abilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside 
its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state rep-
rehends"130 at least where those effects were intended. The Second Cir-
cuit held that the Sherman Act applied to a Canadian company which had 
participated in a cartel intended to affect U.S. importation inasmuch as 
there was direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on the 
U.S. commerce. 131 However, there is no clear narration of how far the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act could extend to inter-
national commerce.132 The effect test in this case was incomplete be-
cause it failed to consider the other nation's interests. 
In Timberland Lumber CO. V. Bank of America, 133 the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals recognized the effect doctrine by imposing additional 
consideration of balancing interests in regard to the notion of "interna-
tional comity."134 This case concerned an action by a U.S. company al-
leging that the defendants in Honduras had conspired to exclude it from 
the Honduran lumber market, from where it planned to export to the U.S. 
The Court laid down a tripartite analysis: first, the federal courts may 
legitimately exercise subject-matter jurisdiction under those statutes; 
second, a greater showing of burden or restraint may be necessary to 
demonstrate that the effect was sufficiently large to present cognizable 
injury to the plaintiffs and therefore a civil violation of the antitrust law; 
and third, there was the additional question, which was unique to the 
international setting, of whether the interest of and links to the United 
States, including the magnitude of the effect on American commerce, 
were sufficiently strong, vis-ii-vis those of other nations, to justify an 
assertion on extraterritorial authority135 as stated: 
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with 
foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties 
and the locations or principal places of business or corporations, 
129. United States V. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
130. Id. at 443. 
131. Id.. 
132. KAPLOW, supra note 20, at 146. "The Shennan Act is presumably not intended to run the 
commercial world, yet to say that only significant effects on United States foreign commerce are 
covered does not identify the threshold of significance." 
133. Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F 2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). 
134. Id. at 615. 
135. Id. at 613. 
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the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected 
to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the 
United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to 
which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American com-
merce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative impor-
tance to the violations charged of conduct within the United 
States as compared with conduct abroad. 136 
167 
It appears that the Court did not deny jurisdiction but merely suggested 
that it should not be exercised where the interests of the U.S. in asserting 
jurisdiction were outweighed by the interests of international comity. 
The Court concluded that subject matter jurisdiction was established 
upon a showing of some actual or intended effect. Additional effects 
might be necessary to establish the violation. Even then, the Court in-
sisted, it may refrain from asserting "extraterritorial authority" unless the 
magnitude of effects in United States commerce was sufficiently strong 
in light of: (1) the several parties' nationality, allegiance, or principal 
locations; (2) the relative importance of domestic and foreign conduct in 
the alleged violation; (3) the relative effects on the several countries in-
volved; (4) the clarity of foreseeability of a purpose to affect or harm 
U.S. commerce; (5) foreign law or policy and degree of conflict with our 
policy or law; and (6) compliance problems. I37 
In comparison, both the U.S. courts and the E.U. courts share some 
common characteristics. Both the U.S. and E.U. courts have demon-
strated their interests to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction because there is 
an economic effect to commerce within their borders. Second, the prin-
ciple used in consideration was that such activity must constitute direct, 
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on their commerce. Thus, 
it can be observed that both the U.S. and the E.U. courts have addressed 
the notion of "international comity" by means of living peacefully with 
other nations in mutual respect and accommodating their interests, the 
rules of politeness, convenience, and goodwill. In reference to the appli-
cability of the effect doctrine to the sui generis databases, although there 
was no evidence of the courts' decision in this matter, both the E.U. and 
the U.S. courts have satisfactorily demonstrated that the effect doctrine 
could provide a sufficient mechanism for the courts to assert extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction. Other countries or regions, despite sometimes touching 
upon intellectual property right questions in their competition policy 
legislation, have limited experience in this area. There are a number of 
136. Id. at 615. 
137. Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 749 F 2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
472 U.S. 1032 (1985). 
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bilateral and multilateral co-operative bodies that have undertaken the 
creation of international competition law, such as the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development (UNCT AD). These bodies 
aim at strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the member 
countries' enforcement of their competition laws against such cartels as 
discussed above. 138 
V. CONCLUSION 
The economic mechanisms and competition law already in place prove to 
be sufficient to promote competition of the database industries. However, 
the WIPO Draft Database Treaty tends to constitute a monopoly in the 
database industries.139 In contrast, the courts in the U.S. and the E.U. 
have tended to apply competition law to promote competition in the da-
tabase industries rather than to support monopoly. To assert extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction, the courts have applied the effect doctrine to an activity 
that created direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect to the 
138. JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 25, at \067-1073; see also Andres Guadamuz Gonzales, 
supra note 26, at 12. 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which is made 
up by the 25 most developed nations, has issued several recommendations on the issue of 
competition policy. Many other international organizations have issued recommendations 
on the issue of trade, globalization and competition, such as the United Nations Confer-
ence on Restrictive Business Practices, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
development (UNCTAD). 
See also, Competition Policy and the Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights, Fourth United Na-
tions Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and 
Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices: Report of the UNCTAD Secretariat, U.N. 
ESCOR, Provisional Agenda Item 6 (b), at 19, U.N. Doc. TDIRBP/CONF.5/6 (2000). 
The competition policy rules applied to IPRs in developed countries or regions nowadays 
are broadly similar, despite some variation in the scope of exemptions granted in this 
area. These rules are based upon the premise that competition policy and the IPRs sys-
tem are complementary, because IPRs promote innovation and its dissemination and 
commercialization, which enhances dynamic efficiency and welfare, outweighing any 
static allocative efficiency losses adversely affecting prices and quantities of products ... 
There is therefore a need for effects to promote mutual understanding and confidence-
building in this area. In this respect, it has been suggested that the deliberations of the 
WTO Working Group on this subject provide and analytical basis for further work on 
fostering common approaches to competition enforcement policies in this area among 
WTO member countries and that, taking into account these deliberations as well as re-
lated economic literature and national enforcement policies, future work in this area 
might cover the following issues: comparative approaches to the treatment of licensing 
arrangements; the role of IP in networks industries; the emergence of new strategies for 
the exercise of market power through the acquisition of IPRs and the use of patent in-
fringement suits to deter the entry of competitors; the concept of "innovation markets" 
and the implications of the territorial divisibility of IPRs and the case for applying the 
doctrine of exhausting ofiPRs in international trade. 
139. Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in 
Respect of Databases to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc. CRNRIDC/6 
(Aug. 3, 1996) [hereinafter WIPO Draft Database Treaty]. 
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free movement of goods and services in the territories and addressed the 
importance of the consideration of international comity and other princi-
ples of international law. Further, it appears that the governmental bodies 
of the U.S. and the E.U. understand the economic mechanisms of De-
mand-Supply and Maximizing Behavior and utilize competition law to 
support them. The public benefits are maximized inasmuch as there is a 
free flow of access to factual contents and information and competition 
flourishes. 
An important question remains regarding the implementation of systems. 
Could economic mechanisms and systems similar to those in developed 
countries work in developing and least developed countries? In order to 
sustain national economic and social infrastructure, in particular human 
resource development, developing and least developed countries need a 
free flow of access to information. De Soto explains that the increasingly 
integrated global economic system has produced important efficiency 
gains, but the new system's market dynamic is still not fully understood. 
Citizens in developing and least developed countries cannot understand 
how to convert their property into capital, and lawyers and legislatures 
are busy studying the legal-economic system in developed countries in-
stead of trying to more deeply understand their fundamental national 
interests. 140 His statement reveals that no matter how far the global eco-
nomic system has been integrated and the foreign advanced technology 
has been transferred and available to them, the citizens in developing and 
least developed countries could hardly ever apply the same logic of legal 
and economic standards, such as how to convert their intellectual assets 
into a balance sheet. 141 Amidst the privatization boom, and the need to 
maximize profit - which is having a growing impact on the concept of 
new mechanisms for controlling the use and dissemination of undevel-
oped compilations and collections of information in the Third World 
countries - the wealth of knowledge has moved freely from generation to 
generation. In addition, Goldstein comments that, in regard to an en-
forcement of intellectual property rights, taking U.S. standards as the 
basis for analysis tends to highlight a large number of enforcement in-
adequacies that exist in developing countries. 142 Problems often men-
140. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE 
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 153-206 (2000). 
141. [d. 
142. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW; CASES AND 
MATERIALS 67 (200 I). Developing countries have significantly changed attitudes toward foreign 
investments and technology transfer in the 1980s. The foreign debt crisis, decreasing private capital 
flows to developing countries, negative experiences with the regulatory approach, outward-oriented 
development strategies, and the ongoing "technological revolution" are some of the possible expla-
nations for the more liberal posture adopted by many developing countries on intellectual property. 
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tioned include: the slowness of the enforcement process; discrimination 
against foreigners; biased court decisions; inadequate civil and criminal 
remedies; and corruption. 143 The enforcement component of a "mature" 
intellectual property rights system is not always easily emulated in de-
veloping countries. If databases were recognized as "a vital element in 
the development of a global information infrastructure and an essential 
tool for promoting economic, cultural and technological advance-
ment,"I44 the concept of the public free flow of access to information 
should be realized for the purpose of human resource development and 
the vital global economy. 
Yet for a developing country the economic implications of the trade-off between static and dynamic 
aspects of the production and allocation of knowledge remain open to debate. 
143. Id. 
144. WIPO Draft Database Treaty, supra note 139, at Preamble Clause. 
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